Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a7196d2191ca84a9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

170.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-06-13
MD5: af94adf94eeb4bd57c76149f53f0c398 SHA-1: ec747c6531f4c6b4d17d7131476b2f5c04d25158 SHA-256: a7196d2191ca84a97575366cbafdf56d3523df3a3c0b67e40350b55d05406398
108 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The critical heuristic firing indicates the presence of a payload exploiting CVE-2017-11882 within an Equation Editor OLE object. This vulnerability is commonly used to execute arbitrary code when the document is opened. No VBA macros were found to be executable, and the document body is minimal, suggesting the primary attack vector is the embedded exploit. The file is an Excel spreadsheet, likely delivered as an attachment.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
9066208e97ec102c6d26472e94374c44c91a325da162df0b492c1cea5d7f2ccf
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD009F5A41/OLe10nATIVE 1901 bytes