Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a6dc37385e639c54…

MALICIOUS

RTF

93.0 KB First seen: 2024-08-05
MD5: 4442ee3018575b65e1fb7c9c5c72ce70 SHA-1: 9f22d29f24283813384e432186f5b096df92b3f6 SHA-256: a6dc37385e639c54aff6476fa41a9ddce064129008ad409bff5a4e2245f76cde
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive further suggests that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically. This exploit is commonly used to download and execute a secondary payload, leading to a full system compromise.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001214.bin
9af6d09ed8cc6f49d5daee96b4d3cdfb414c33e39bf2952fe43b4db004f78d3f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1214 1961 bytes