Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a6d29009bfdd5c44…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.1 KB Created: 2021-09-30 10:07:12 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 9739612a38c2f45685da493ed1a86eb7 SHA-1: 704a8083e5e3363e197fc610902d770e45499fe0 SHA-256: a6d29009bfdd5c44a67e7e469d1c86a16bd5cd80cdcb93471a85199c3fa3767b
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF document functions as a link farm, containing numerous URLs that point to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting. The ML classifier strongly indicates malicious intent, and the structure suggests an attempt to lure users to external sites, likely for further exploitation or phishing. No scripts were extracted, limiting the analysis of direct execution capabilities.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9939

Heuristics 5

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://bhavalaya.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/xokagatatugaba.pdf
    • http://chinalabware.es/d/files/sezafalabumirurazezixinij.pdf
    • http://leeharringtonhomes.com/userfiles/file/83485272711.pdf
    • http://buren-kompanie.de/userfiles/files/90110338188.pdf
    • http://gzcaifeilai.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/202109141157192362.pdf
    • https://bazab.ru/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zanudasetokuw.pdf
    • http://zoop-tech.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/34009178319.pdf
    • http://osingenieria.com/images/admin/file/sizega.pdf
    • http://irk-yoga.ru/upload/files/16406519303.pdf
    • https://www.brunosistemi.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16151036320cc9---79705065426.pdf
    • http://i-daa-wl.de/userfiles/67189294365.pdf
    • http://cdseoulps.com/uploadfile/fckeditor/file/rudijigapore.pdf
    • http://train-in-japan.com/images/blog/file/91508282161.pdf
    • http://gd-weimi.com/upfolder/e/files/20210902142615.pdf
    • http://crescentcarpets.com/userfiles/file/27887273627.pdf
    • http://myepres.com/HotelEstimator/userfiles/file/24934008083.pdf
    • http://yilip.net/userData/board/file/kezoxezatafudix.pdf
    • http://cnhhgj.com/upfiles/userfiles/file/fuguvamipak.pdf
    • https://khangle.vn/uploads/images/files/17529967507.pdf
    • https://www.euroservicemilano.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161339bd41a794---84075012934.pdf
    • https://csn-alliance.com/data/files/nosisamukuzusurosojus.pdf
    • http://byecook.com/ckupload/files/rasereziwalunebov.pdf
    • https://childprotectionindia.com/lexcyberia/userfiles/files/rewuvofalaposukekemil.pdf
    • http://studiopedrazzini.eu/userfiles/files/6561633256.pdf
    • https://karatenarrewarren.com.au/ckfinder/userfiles/files/fusuvu.pdf
    • http://www.oknookna.pl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614c2432d4ec0---9768610183.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/A3Ryygt5BCM/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+transfer+files+from+one+phone+to+another+phone
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c46c.bin
4447abdc8c32373947f8123a7e87af7fb9de1e0e06d71c744065b968f68a0927
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC46C 10700 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000dcc7.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDCC7 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000f4d9.bin
cdb2d7fc4e47ebd07e5a48889024b0cfaf2629f655e149aa916147370b6c07a4
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF4D9 17968 bytes