Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a6ce4c407b65fb6b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

769.0 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 4a22bb8c0c08f13b0c32ffd6a505a208 SHA-1: 0fe7555ae0ae77252533e81ae11a353321ad3c04 SHA-256: a6ce4c407b65fb6b9f408f6ba6d571dd45af079e520a08ca414b9b6295606b26
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics for Equation Editor and CVE-2017-8759, indicating exploitation of a vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The ".objupdate" directive suggests that the embedded object is automatically activated upon opening the document, leading to code execution. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, but the critical heuristics strongly point to an exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000b5d01.bin
ee93d20261505991417892d3edbf75cca44fe7df8ba3b7aaacd0f7866bd048ba		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB5D01 3739 bytes

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