Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a69bd8fb3c1f8e94…

MALICIOUS

PDF

62.5 KB
MD5: 04160f09b8a09ec17924619edd427bbd SHA-1: 03eaf96ff8fe2bd01c9ea95413c02ff23f917ee6 SHA-256: a69bd8fb3c1f8e94a0716d6808978365feed652da1a4b88748bab13c5c3ec056
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

This PDF file exploits the CVE-2010-0188 vulnerability in Adobe Reader, leveraging XFA forms to deliver a malicious payload. The embedded script payload and ClamAV detection confirm its malicious nature. The script appears to be heavily obfuscated, but the primary attack vector is the exploitation of the known vulnerability.

Heuristics 7

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-93 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-93
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
5bd9afc6265893204cc3d6274ce08ae2040ec1cb9dd2b04c0fabeb1ddb84be61		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 63244 bytes

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