Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a68e70545ec10e44…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.7 KB Created: 2021-09-09 07:10:03 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-16
MD5: 6ad12b18be8add5859902d341082c2ff SHA-1: bd60a0eb6e6e279488cdd821d37251ea6d6622b7 SHA-256: a68e70545ec10e445a98e190eed311f9f40b62e08cf27c3db4ab9c8b00438f8d
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and multiple links to external PDFs hosted on various domains, some of which appear to be compromised WordPress sites. The heuristic 'SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE' indicates the document likely prompts the user to install a browser extension or update, a common tactic for malware delivery. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9977

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://klgd.spokoino.ru/i/upload/files/tatazinolexixuxixino.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://unaizahic.com/Files/files/90182768218.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tccsrl.org/userfiles/files/61602392244.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.geosuiteonline.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16130d7e769906---89052738172.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://saraiaser.nl/userfiles/file/85365227967.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://backupcenters.com/userfiles/file/61393653066.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tselectromechanical.com/uploads/CKfiles/files/30115298703.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://visusmarble.com/images_upload/files/lokidazoxomebuwifopagire.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jts-electrical.co.uk/ckfinder/userfiles/files/96321357068.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://anpo.vn/upload/files/69385771420.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lenaoyunlar.com/calisma2/files/uploads/zizedafejitewamid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aarogyamedico.com/userfiles/file/34083177089.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.airportlimofortlauderdale.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161333051860e9---wawetupuzefufaleke.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://scuderia512.com/js/upload/files/30346842454.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.energetisch-therapeut-estie.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613447b08c83a---jazizawokowan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.fattyweng.com.sg/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613503116f6db---21550355648.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://andreaslasnik.com/data/files/xesusovitabekikadota.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://business-plan-capalpha.fr/mbp/upload/images/images/upload/ckfinder/90254558227.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://coverline.ro/userfiles/file/falujoxipabusijotobejexak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ensegun2.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/xonazusamaju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://earthchartercities.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161356e3c6f6bd---gememerufes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://coonvalleycc.com/userfiles/file/14559304845.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/fzgW7-mxBc0/uplcv?utm_term=macro+clicker+chromePDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f9f5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF9F5 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00011207.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11207 18776 bytes
SHA-256: cf6953241a640679b27740f0e4bcae71abb1c01a43693ddeb634416357295605
font_02_sfnt_off00014286.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14286 10208 bytes
SHA-256: 8893ae4ef42a6a82fc91290b1f431f5214172a899a4777f0bd2be77376d77c6e

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