Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a68d47f7da656dc4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.9 KB Created: 2021-08-10 13:05:19 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-02
MD5: 7d4fb6d1e8fff9d84f5897b796dcc82c SHA-1: 6adc2a1810ee6a3a4edeb821e3ff0c5009c1cc6c SHA-256: a68d47f7da656dc44f618b8dbd35d3a053deb0f83dbef01c903a06811bae60e4
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1539 Steal or Forge Credentials

This PDF document was flagged by multiple heuristics and a machine learning classifier as malicious, specifically indicating a phishing and credential harvesting attempt. The presence of embedded JavaScript and numerous external links, many pointing to compromised CMS upload directories, suggests an attempt to redirect the user to a phishing site. The document's content also includes lures for urgency, password-protected archives, and MFA harvesting, all consistent with credential phishing tactics.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9976

Heuristics 11

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • MFA / one-time-code harvesting lure high SE_MFA_LURE
    Document asks for a one-time code, authenticator approval, or MFA confirmation — consistent with credential phishing kits that steal session tokens or abuse multi-factor authentication
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cructi.ru/uplcv?utm_term=how+many+questions+are+on+the+nims+100+test PDF link annotation
    • http://studiomanzella.com/userfiles/files/fixefebosozazujopam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://iideree.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160804859400be---59091595475.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://adhdadvisory.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607d2d2913cbe---fopajifel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rasmesafar.net/basefile/basefiles/24523113503.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://webmodels.studio/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a5f3dd23c83---zakoduzun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kirks-pool.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b4d88a6bae2---69697527736.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://barexkft.hu/userfiles/file/wodinuzofuladig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://transsnabstroy.com/userfiles/file/pojipikifagizosufubup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.jacenter.org/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/ponevo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://volkshilfe-vlbg.at/images/content/files/dutimiremitolexeroniz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alirezamirmohammadi.com/images/upload/files/19937918663.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://laurallo.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/90902644510.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://egyseg.eu/ckfinder/userfiles/files/gopapelegimuwunukuvel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://goodwill.pl/userfiles/file/guraxamemowefesifuterawi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.isnb.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b4d9e499451ee77260901ddad8b981ab/23795961576.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://baconbites.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3t2i7a2me6s40u115ccocnc6u7/gagonajutatatezikolew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rmgoals.com/userfiles/files/peperom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://campcolefamilyreunion.com/clients/82065/File/80633860607.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lokmangal.co.in/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b91f8495fd3725624b43342420d3253a/legupan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.rebranded.tv/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a7b46370430---94146431178.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.icodar.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bce3b834f75---wevul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sportyou.fr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/doxavivir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.die-umzugsfabrik.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a991e633b28---12751730768.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ecdd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xECDD 18048 bytes
SHA-256: 0d6aa75d52190a77fd0712ff802f5c366f886fbf847976f88f146ac79962183d
font_01_sfnt_off00011c8d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11C8D 10936 bytes
SHA-256: 9e880b6e708fa33cc5289e967cbbea97fb9cc4ca03be69ae614955890156a749
font_02_sfnt_off000135d4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x135D4 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1