Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a68aeda5d022f2a6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.6 KB Created: 2021-09-06 21:52:57 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 993961783f30ace0e0416a832a7f2a88 SHA-1: fb1c8b1e405d2907cc304d4b3e27e4d97180ec72 SHA-256: a68aeda5d022f2a64ff02a8cada7f406198eb89de1d16789c5381eca387db04b
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many of which point to websites hosted on compromised CMS platforms or disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm designed to distribute malicious content or phish users. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. Although no scripts were directly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links are indicative of a phishing or malware distribution campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9992

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://tsradviseurs.nl/mailing/images/photo/file/rasure.pdf
    • http://teplo76.ru/uploads/file/naxitoxonusotuvabuwozekel.pdf
    • http://franklinbristerharveyfamily.com/clients/a/a8/a8910385c57dfddac3c6311e2bd1422e/File/wavezamuraboduxa.pdf
    • http://autowagon.it/userfiles/files/8116072258.pdf
    • http://www.sandzthabapanel.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a6b748735c0---rukuxodusumarorigulivuke.pdf
    • http://onellenorzes.com/uploads/files/35310878189.pdf
    • http://timeyear-v.com/userfiles/file/79699846542.pdf
    • http://bogelaipigeon.com/upload/file/27191995740.pdf
    • http://nsdadventist.org/FCKData/file/vebagebaxivugogukebada.pdf
    • http://atthaya.com/file_media/file_image/file/6003666345.pdf
    • https://artinterior.bg/userfiles/file/91382357619.pdf
    • https://kantankacreative.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f741c81b22391220237c399c2006638e/muzuzizisadimosu.pdf
    • http://synowka.pl/galeria/file/wapuzuvi.pdf
    • https://www.infratechgroep.nl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/614a526198d13e470bf541f4d69116dd/26402854887.pdf
    • http://bephoangdung.vn/uploads/ckfinder/files/55690244710.pdf
    • http://angelsolutions.ro/ckeditor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/96352097155.pdf
    • https://shriayurvednagpur.org/public/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zokejilelawowexegisoge.pdf
    • http://dxqzx.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/20210816_175335.pdf
    • http://malagi.pl/user-files/fck/file/vukitedopuburux.pdf
    • http://lpsa.cz/userfiles/file/45451838372.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/GLLx1DTH0VQ/uplcv?utm_term=david+copperfield+original+text+pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cce4.bin
85919be0ae16bc232358175d14cf54b963031b3307407551f36b89d7545c891e
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCCE4 10796 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000e5b6.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE5B6 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000fdc8.bin
d65e20133a9c69d0ab09658a3041a8e5bcb2b5b0739e7ae65f38048ddf98b52b
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFDC8 16776 bytes