Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a681967d5d91f1de…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

55.0 KB
MD5: 245fa98d0fc156ccd21c92b31ec8c5c7 SHA-1: b5cabd660aafef98fc3fbc987aa1bc4d5884fa17 SHA-256: a681967d5d91f1def07dcde80d561b9621381760b781c970746673d53e7bfcd7
60 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The OOXML file is encrypted with a default password and contains an embedded OLE object, indicating it's likely an exploit carrier. The presence of an embedded document suggests an attempt to deliver a secondary payload. Without further analysis of the embedded object, the exact attack pattern and family remain undetermined.

Heuristics 2

  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.