Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a674d7d5d453be9a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

404.0 KB
MD5: 9ac7a0ab35fa796f3133d2d7fe90d320 SHA-1: 4925e02aaa49ade5d0dcec2e84c95b5c7fed8257 SHA-256: a674d7d5d453be9a6884e6c36d85d84927204c9cb60a1d6d3172ddd6a00d272c
60 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an encrypted OOXML file, indicated by the 'OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML' and 'OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE' heuristics. The encryption suggests it's intended to evade static analysis and likely acts as a carrier for a malicious payload, possibly an embedded macro or exploit. No specific family could be identified due to the encryption.

Heuristics 2

  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.