PDF malware analysis — malicious · a6574a6e523acc12

MALICIOUS

PDF

14.2 KB

MD5: 7ecd0f33c7d9efc9e5a0dccb02eca50a SHA-1: 76d6dc1b4441938ebac291776cf9a1e56fb92865 SHA-256: a6574a6e523acc12f4c707ef0e9f3f54c11029fd38aed2869c9ac516964c61c3

124 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical ClamAV detection for 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962' strongly indicates a known PDF exploit. The presence of 'PDF_XFA_TITLE_BASE26_EVAL_STAGER' heuristic confirms the use of XFA forms for staging an exploit. The embedded URL, while seemingly benign, is often used in conjunction with such exploits to download further stages. The embedded files are likely components of the exploit or the subsequent payload.

Heuristics 6

ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962
XFA title base-26 eval stager high PDF_XFA_TITLE_BASE26_EVAL_STAGER

PDF XFA initialize script reads an encoded payload from the document title, builds event.target.eval and String.fromCharCode from string fragments, decodes base-26 character pairs, and evals the recovered stage. This is an exploit-kit staging pattern; the static bytes do not prove a specific CVE by themselves.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
XFA form low PDF_XFA

PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON

PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_file_obj0041.bin` `c06dcd026a7ea0536b63e07ce688691b585339a3ab7ff59065e546b56308c7bb`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0x2AD8	85 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0042.bin` `dda0835df994b8be920f715db36452f6cee7bb42bbc9c897f878a7b298ba8e91`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 42 at offset 0x2B8A	1029 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0043.bin` `d7f7bd6434fff4670f50233bfe5cf596fac9d4d44d97771942e495ed6801d5e8`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 43 at offset 0x2DA3	1949 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0044.bin` `3dd68f00f4fcb366a2a3a17c65cb2626eeddf5ea5713302d374310561d810169`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 44 at offset 0x322A	144 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0045.bin` `10c03f88a5f0a0833dc5b2c8ac295b3a3c6f65e23889eb8cc1dc6fe29bf7f275`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0x32D6	77 bytes

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