Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a64bf352b7e08fbb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.5 KB Created: 2020-10-13 10:58:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: bcef839a0e8292a194440852a5aaa553 SHA-1: 628257621f8d7cc32c7deb49f2416b09ef765a0b SHA-256: a64bf352b7e08fbb028f060824b155c7897fb03f72d3a710ec93d8378c6ee0ac
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=harvest+moon+light+of+hope+gift+guide In PDF document text
    • https://zoxuzuxebexot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969059/tidivobinimigip-banez-batipafon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jawasolasazilem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379174/beparinunij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/da50c7e0ec8f483.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xojerajap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384359/1441493.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bedizegoresupa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379398/8e42bfb8d1b0f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gimejexoxixaza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872185/aa94aa7f99c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zoxuzuxebexot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969059/winepogor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jawasolasazilem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379174/sefaritonos-nukivafeka-retisebop-regaxumex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gimejexoxixaza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872185/kadupe_ripovu_jozovagazemewe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037071.mozfiles.com/files/1037071/72974763475.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038614.mozfiles.com/files/1038614/wiwudivibopikijujinadalo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1042345.mozfiles.com/files/1042345/titutafasigizamelomura.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039772.mozfiles.com/files/1039772/53677852374.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040260.mozfiles.com/files/1040260/48575085730.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5a023ccc-d6ba-4fb1-b339-b33519811623/2088222414.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c7655ef8-342d-4df6-8669-e01aa588d3ad/89553420081.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006535.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6535 5360 bytes
SHA-256: ca80126e0115a26f8b36fd99d910f0f1e0c16392e927dfbc9db46047fc1e15e2
font_01_sfnt_off00007742.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7742 10392 bytes
SHA-256: 2d64118a14864eb5db0faa16bb047613a33e4cdef037edda5ce28ef05f472106
font_02_sfnt_off00009ac5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9AC5 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 0d0f64e27578eb124b8bc81c7eceacdd166e22eddd95c81328e9fbd7de2a6333

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