Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a649bf8650131a64…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.5 KB Created: 2021-04-11 06:42:49 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-22
MD5: 5acbdf31e4406060c9d9da753e32ad42 SHA-1: 266c8488c69ed173e499617f9bd596e7a4f31826 SHA-256: a649bf8650131a64fd1c5fff4af067b1c6dd518b7145c61fddcfafe7efa0833a
214 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to redirector infrastructure and link farms, indicating a phishing or scam attempt. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier further support its malicious nature. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the presence of numerous malicious URLs suggests an attempt to redirect users to malicious sites, likely for credential harvesting or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://dafemum.ru/strik?utm_term=realidades+1+teacher+edition+online In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/nifijagik/6BgeigF/tizekaramuxoxegarom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xapabareduvan.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134395213/xonodemowila_dowaxenisaje_nojotemagorut_tenem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lanejaselisipu.22web.org/daughter_of_invention_reading_check_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/ratevusur/ezhajgF/93731465735.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sinonulu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134654736/3720c14a9b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4448992/normal_5fefc128b389e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/lajawawinu/SiijcRn/xajerekiwajaveru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lukazerud.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134343231/3912791.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4377401/normal_5ff00a2a2e8e9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/timeziso/ap_psychology_unit_1_study_guide_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wifukedot/89412465204.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kavugusepe/tonivekanemawelonugibide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fuwuzerijofa/wiborimazeveruwaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gimusatis.rf.gd/customer_ageing_report_transaction_code_in_sap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gapivegek/how_to_read_an_ekg_test.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nosepevozux/buzep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wazagidonux/zanoxasofuzaluvor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fajujiju/44006472126.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fe73.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFE73 5088 bytes
SHA-256: 2057d149c93e56270dfbb651e53893b49dabcb910033b2c57a23bb655610b58b
font_01_sfnt_off00010fba.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10FBA 10912 bytes
SHA-256: 495624e0c23db262e2dbd507e19c3b62aa2a4df2499335ae9b842a005fd61053

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