Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a63784b3e0bb1084…

MALICIOUS

RTF

94.2 KB First seen: 2024-10-03
MD5: 0b85d493bea8edd559099ac22bb0040e SHA-1: 7a666e1546006ea2a51f3e7e796ba893e14cbab2 SHA-256: a63784b3e0bb108479158100de6eb95033fbe3c02e789dbf089370fc13df24cb
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. The \objupdate heuristic indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to code execution. This strongly suggests an exploit targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability, likely for the purpose of downloading and executing a secondary payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001a77.bin
f296f25e24caf183a9238c6c08e14cf4efd81090d759c0d06fc07032559bdbe9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1A77 1943 bytes