Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a62a5eb3728a464d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

38.8 KB Created: 2025-07-01 10:39:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 8c4fcde2b019e56c74edcc1847d9df18 SHA-1: ae40966da8406004f152dcba6ca1cb356dfd6383 SHA-256: a62a5eb3728a464d99f0b39872b74ecab1ea312afabf1f0d84ca84a7ce1657a5
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample is a DOCX file that leverages an altChunk to import an RTF file named 'Albania.rtf'. This RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, and the presence of the RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic indicates that these objects are likely activated automatically upon opening the document. This mechanism is commonly used to execute malicious payloads. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was not provided, limiting further analysis of the specific lure.

Heuristics 5

  • altChunk imports embedded RTF (RTF injection) critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF
    Document inlines an embedded RTF via an aFChunk relationship and a <w:altChunk> body element. This is the canonical RTF-injection wrapper used to smuggle RTF exploits (Equation Editor / URL Moniker / objdata) past DOCX-only scanners. Word opens the wrapper and executes the RTF inline. Recursing into the RTF for the exact exploit primitive.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    (in altChunk RTF word/Albania.rtf) RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    (in altChunk RTF word/Albania.rtf) RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    (in altChunk RTF word/Albania.rtf) RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://opendope.org/xpaths
    • http://opendope.org/conditions
    • http://opendope.org/questions
    • http://opendope.org/components
    • http://opendope.org/SmartArt/DataHierarchy
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/schemaLibrary/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chart
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chartDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/spreadsheetDrawing
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2008/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/compatibility
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/lockedCanvas

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003a12.bin
5c63e7cea9ae45286ad25a3fdd1ce3118b693a0c9bbf190f4641a0d892686fab		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A12 31019 bytes
objdata_01_off0001dcbb.bin
9e8b68393d57d3e633893d134c107c3da58d6e56a7e72494dca54b9ee885b5f4		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1DCBB 584266 bytes

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