Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a61e84c84a04da94…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

247.2 KB Created: 2021-11-08 10:13:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 650458b34bb8cf456107814222012fde SHA-1: 8b77353465a07bb116ac8081efab57e2ef4bc103 SHA-256: a61e84c84a04da94ab4321aedd54e9aa87d1c58ef16167fa0fd2ce12798dd3e0
69 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The document was identified as malicious due to the presence of an embedded OLE object. Further analysis revealed that this OLE object is a package containing an executable file (jar). This suggests the document is designed to deliver a secondary payload. The embedded OLE object and its contents are the primary indicators of malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
6cc6d2feff75618ca608e830d08ff2ac22da4b8a4882eaac10ceb1a28cb347b9		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 236544 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
4dcab60f974bf02bb7d607e62d5f81b4d2e5ae4f2d65086874af4aa404ada9d3		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 231643 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.99, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
35375f4f0eb659d0bb52888727edbde9558748aeaf78ca0a388c24b8e8b37b70		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5140 bytes

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