Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a5fc4a7f8195d480…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.3 KB Created: 2020-09-02 17:48:04 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 8f426490d91d5be5f800e5e6aa244498 SHA-1: d86e24923990c665bbad07bb28f7a4f7d614f87c SHA-256: a5fc4a7f8195d480b89f5de6b407ad6313caa15bb23f9233e49d5ce227192c78
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a heuristic firing for a malicious redirector link, which points to a URL offering a crack for 'Xsplit broadcaster'. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, also contains this URL and numerous other links, many of which are hosted on static.usrfiles.com. This suggests a link farm or redirection scheme designed to lead users to malicious content. The primary intent appears to be social engineering through a software crack lure.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=xsplit+broadcaster++crackeado
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/7133/2767/files/fonizijejosemoxovid.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/4216/9244/files/sisolakexukufereka.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/3164/8661/files/tutux.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/5a1791_1e484aaa2ac24474a2a7b5de70672c9a.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/8da65f_0ecacd21feca4f3eb3a1ed6a64edd868.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/2b3f46_2ccde6e52b774dc3bc5946b3335b2e87.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/c63dba_028fe82b985d4abe92a3c846ff57afa4.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/73c254_18254e57dcd54ddebb404b56bbea5acc.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/67f5f7_bab57f8427c1455db9a391a1ab81c414.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/6cfc61_1b0c6bf37e9c44a79089f7bd28aa4966.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/724bd4_78b03953655941abba36f69c4954aa63.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/9e41f0_7ce5a324b3db489ab0738d420b9833d3.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_79eeae42dda942149e7ae1774aa040b5.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000061cf.bin
c64e72f096c59bdf5693da1563b946687193d76e3669ecc6e6cf28cfce26e541
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x61CF 4932 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000728d.bin
1535b4ad8c1784f5a6baa2ad55ee3e94364a27d6e2c4105529679feb27ea5315
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x728D 10536 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00009692.bin
0d0f64e27578eb124b8bc81c7eceacdd166e22eddd95c81328e9fbd7de2a6333
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9692 4324 bytes