Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a5f2e6599f25329f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

19.9 KB
MD5: f80d6fc83b86df36b3138a3e8ea33bbb SHA-1: 651de4ecb43b8dba15de8a1fdfed93e08d22b59d SHA-256: a5f2e6599f25329f76f81551a929f87dcb20f217a8986cc51016d3527b5690cb
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic. This indicates the exploitation of a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic further suggests that the embedded object is designed to be automatically activated upon opening. While no specific script was extracted, the combination of these heuristics strongly implies that the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability to execute code, likely for downloading and running a secondary payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000013f2.bin
00ad472fc3d2efdc8df18b1298ce004c692b89dfa3d6b519ee7607dd89521c8a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x13F2 1445 bytes