Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a5eba5d37480cc1d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.3 KB Created: 2020-09-30 00:49:54 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: b6c5e0d62bbdc490fdcdbcdd6540b3ed SHA-1: 567ec7d7442b9d938d5f34835997d21da649c5bd SHA-256: a5eba5d37480cc1d2ce70000953578aec6c0f2595e7d41b8ed3791afeeff2410
224 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/pify?keyword=bluestacks+directx+%25D0%25B8%25D0%25BB%25D0%25B8+opengl In PDF document text
    • http://betipew.ralphroyrealty.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407164/pujup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sitafiwul.preciousdreamsdoghouse.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383314/mokejadu_bekuxijopawago_wuvusizi_xesebigowa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pobokesir.strongherfasther.org/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969937/zujifig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.sdss4seoul.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398332/3ed3896f63.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.lv-connect.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740186/jovivepovepalolabinu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zilezoze.investwithsmdc.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814956/zutuzifixi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://susev.sacredheartofjesustheologicalseminary.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814579/1ca5da.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://totuka.septicserviceshunstville.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070420/zijejigidi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.leopardstouch.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739415/nasegowonimeka_xidawokixev_pedebubijixe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3180dd29-913f-4274-9b73-883babd64f0f/31632840570.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b8aec0fe-3b75-43d8-bb4d-34dad1973420/87777983660.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/aa7748f8-b251-405f-8ef0-022b60c06af6/49100144841.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006292.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6292 5600 bytes
SHA-256: d0e9a3f23b2556ce2e18b191bedda1fb1901a531f95c5f0937299d1641394818
font_01_sfnt_off000075c4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x75C4 11000 bytes
SHA-256: c318e757c482d887dd20f4e044042f3c07172c8329d960b47d692d588d23ef56