Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a5cd6482c88c28ca…

MALICIOUS

PDF

14.1 KB
MD5: 6788da00c72499c6f88e16e86b350a1b SHA-1: 106d2868a1e3f98dbb97d000857bb874eb3f9f62 SHA-256: a5cd6482c88c28caeaf76b9965a1d5410e2a5bb558e93e165a56e76ec9722d64
124 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The critical ClamAV detection and the PDF_XFA_TITLE_BASE26_EVAL_STAGER heuristic indicate this PDF is designed to exploit a vulnerability. The presence of an embedded URL further suggests a delivery mechanism for malicious content. The XFA stager likely attempts to deobfuscate and execute a payload.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962
  • XFA title base-26 eval stager high PDF_XFA_TITLE_BASE26_EVAL_STAGER
    PDF XFA initialize script reads an encoded payload from the document title, builds event.target.eval and String.fromCharCode from string fragments, decodes base-26 character pairs, and evals the recovered stage. This is an exploit-kit staging pattern; the static bytes do not prove a specific CVE by themselves.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0041.bin
c06dcd026a7ea0536b63e07ce688691b585339a3ab7ff59065e546b56308c7bb
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0x2ABC 85 bytes
embedded_file_obj0042.bin
dda0835df994b8be920f715db36452f6cee7bb42bbc9c897f878a7b298ba8e91
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 42 at offset 0x2B6E 1029 bytes
embedded_file_obj0043.bin
d7f7bd6434fff4670f50233bfe5cf596fac9d4d44d97771942e495ed6801d5e8
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 43 at offset 0x2D87 1949 bytes
embedded_file_obj0044.bin
3dd68f00f4fcb366a2a3a17c65cb2626eeddf5ea5713302d374310561d810169
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 44 at offset 0x320E 144 bytes
embedded_file_obj0045.bin
10c03f88a5f0a0833dc5b2c8ac295b3a3c6f65e23889eb8cc1dc6fe29bf7f275
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0x32BA 77 bytes