Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a59a43bc9b4ba0c7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.6 KB First seen: 2023-09-18
MD5: 4cfc0e1b4abecad9e5e862d34d9b014d SHA-1: d5601ee0c53264b267e78dec2b08d43d6736212d SHA-256: a59a43bc9b4ba0c700a6e6b128e521e68c4e9ac1bf8de1196490ca2cae84d479
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data that is automatically linked and updated, indicating an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities for payload execution. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" heuristics strongly suggests the document is designed to trigger an embedded object upon opening. Without further script or body content, the exact payload and delivery mechanism remain unclear, but the technique points to a classic OLE exploitation vector.

Heuristics 3

  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000095.bin
61f521bc710f89cb849ba963c862043745ec960570c88da0b10b96a5ce213ce8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x95 1744 bytes