Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a57a039ed0820c17…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

45.5 KB First seen: 2022-08-09
MD5: 178551cfa57e5df14eae9661a28ec401 SHA-1: 3b4738b7386b42cfc724f5753775271c1b4f1e40 SHA-256: a57a039ed0820c170d07eef08b9bda0ecea55fd6fc631c2370b4af93e8555094
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an encrypted Office document that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE object. The exploit carrier points to the URL http://jmcglone.com@trimurl.co/7AMsio, which is likely used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The document's encrypted nature and the use of a known exploit indicate a malicious intent to compromise the user's system.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://jmcglone.com@trimurl.co/7AMsio

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