Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a56ecd17e4a33966…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

33.0 KB
MD5: 91cdea0652a27bb62910751687e76125 SHA-1: 7adfe8d8637c9c6263a1b251086391028c075a9c SHA-256: a56ecd17e4a339661373cde7c2c7b668b8f3581445269cc9626534718d0e0247
60 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML file is encrypted with a default password, a common technique for obfuscating malicious content. Heuristics indicate it's an exploit carrier containing an embedded OLE object, suggesting it's designed to drop or execute a secondary payload. Without a document body or scripts, the exact delivery mechanism and payload are unclear, but the structure points to a malicious attachment.

Heuristics 2

  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.