Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a56d9efe9d11c718…

MALICIOUS

PDF

95.2 KB Created: 2021-07-26 01:52:02 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: ad36946edff968b11b9745aac013e669 SHA-1: eca902791603e3d2e0017213c7bd6d5661ab4ee4 SHA-256: a56d9efe9d11c7184e7137f444624ad4864bfa15e98f4e365e0f89902bd42343
192 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous links pointing to compromised WordPress sites, specifically targeting upload directories, which is a common technique for hosting malicious payloads. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely a phishing or trojan delivery mechanism. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the structure and URL patterns suggest the PDF is designed to trick users into downloading a secondary malicious file.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9941

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) or Microsoft license-boilerplate documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.acefence.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609e96c87f45a---fixejubume.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://valleypainclinic.org/userfiles/file/3482886016.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cald-lighting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f5a74d070461f2fee684750aa331124e/70348475934.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.hkqi.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608d64bd1e698---10006748836.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.radioemka.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16098c139a7411---xozomotexolukavi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://csc0512.com/userfiles/file/20210616031022_7dhjg3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sicompk.com/survey/userfiles/files/tetufol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://seikai.jp/free_images/files/37039878687.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://oiweld.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/440ed3ab05cf20f85d7af6d1e3256235/19387013657.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://asesoriagarpe.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d4b921de34---81546660180.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://romanakladatelstvi.cz/userfiles/file/waburoxewonadozewan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://drtamerturan.com/file/4807049187.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://spencershaulageltd.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/65365275411b635a0cc8334355c75c98/24359878536.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.inhd.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b27ef649a4c---pazuxabazeze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://binhruamuinanobac.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2hk157svp7787q06qrog8gua3s/68881082873.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://readandenjoy.ae/userfiles/files/kevajagamidok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cuacongtudongbinhduong.com/upload/files/10166741588.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lws-realestate.com/userfiles/files/vojepemonabotinogopase.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://speakingparrot.com/upload/ckfinder/files/53994409540.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.ezhealthcheck.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/86tfm5vpkkovuh4al4dddl08f5/3239345623.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://coyada.com/up_images/up_images/witumonojopoger.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://otdelkamos.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2e96a84b02db1b6dee20356512fcd602/48291240980.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/A3Ryygt5BCM/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+determine+value+of+saudi+arabia+gold+coinsPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_005_off00014b54.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x14B54 20644 bytes
SHA-256: 1d5a680786d21feba1fe87f2ce942e4de46f347a0814a620388c4a0677309868
font_00_sfnt_off0000eb0f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEB0F 17488 bytes
SHA-256: f4a9689532b9d8dee24dbe9914b55a3035388528cf7692f5f89f3c122f89257c
font_01_sfnt_off00011935.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11935 11200 bytes
SHA-256: f675bc1378c63291112a09e332cefc9f1c90a4af8a157e491141c320ecaea368
font_02_sfnt_off00013343.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13343 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1