PDF malware analysis — malicious · a50bc17444150395

MALICIOUS

PDF

12.0 KB

MD5: 46d63ab7f92d6ea64b78430df2db8aa1 SHA-1: 04703417c1c7f2f453327e6202fa58544e40124a SHA-256: a50bc17444150395f5baf520a96989f2ce857f089be2eb77c1f273125d5a63de

186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that exploits CVE-2007-5659 via the 'collab.collectEmailInfo' function. This JavaScript acts as a stager, decoding and executing further malicious code. The presence of multiple JavaScript streams and the ClamAV detection strongly indicate a malicious PDF designed to deliver a second-stage payload. The exact nature of the second-stage payload could not be determined due to obfuscation, but the exploit chain is clear.

Heuristics 7

Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659

PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063
Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER

PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN

PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0007_000.js` `eb39e2de4dbbc100de6d3e30aa43ff78fa075618862ba1ebba5151ea3a3b848d`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19D	273 bytes
`annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js` `6d641b8470c3f262203b9819b9ee8a9addae5468e39e92abf16769d4b955a882`	deobfuscated-js	annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A	5159 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`deobfuscated.js` `6f9adf12f351764a0ee7972f644e555901297fd0dba50159d004f0459dce7897`	deobfuscated-js	PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass	76240 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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