MALICIOUS
194
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
The PDF contains critical XFA JavaScript heap-spray exploit code, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. The presence of embedded files, including a larger one named 'embedded_file_obj0014.bin', suggests a downloader or dropper functionality. The unescape() and String.fromCharCode() calls further point to obfuscated script execution, likely to download and run a secondary payload.
Heuristics 10
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XFA form contains risky executable script high PDF_XFA_SCRIPTPDF embeds an XFA form whose script block contains exploit, submission/launch, or shell-execution primitives. Ordinary LiveCycle print/update scripts are left as generic XFA/JS signals unless stronger behavior is present.
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XFA JavaScript heap-spray exploit code critical PDF_XFA_HEAP_SPRAYPDF contains XFA script content with heap-spray or shellcode-like JavaScript markers such as large encoded word sequences, util.pack, large arrays, or spray variable names. This is a weaponised Adobe Reader exploit pattern, not a normal interactive form.
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unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPEunescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits
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Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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XFA form low PDF_XFAPDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
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String.fromCharCode low PDF_FROMCHARCODEString.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically. Common in benign JavaScript libraries for codepoint manipulation, so this alone is informational; weaponised use is also caught by the dedicated fromCharCode-stage and exploit-shape rules.
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AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTONPDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.html
- http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATION
- http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
- http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/
- http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xtd/
- http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xfdf/
- http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-form/2.8/
Extracted artifacts 7
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
embedded_file_obj0012.bind81baa73e490e4cb879e13927cacd1dd1be37524a37eac51603e15117c578777 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 12 at offset 0x7BBA | 84 bytes |
embedded_file_obj0013.bin24c130f03a4cf51d470b536e94c1e58af67665739e200e0ce198ad41086243c0 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 13 at offset 0x7C51 | 228 bytes |
embedded_file_obj0014.bin45b624d9f1a8478eb8a52c63a5dcb658f7d4deb722962d8e56674ad2894f58f1 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 14 at offset 0x7D7A | 14270 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 7 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 7 long base64-like blob(s).
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embedded_file_obj0015.binc97e0522381d6196cc0695f35f4d065f15c9c86a9601a7f776c6afd3f4c6b460 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 15 at offset 0xB57B | 199 bytes |
embedded_file_obj0016.bin846dfecc0c93797cb6db4301f6af323fffd76ffdf8c053c439495412785138e7 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 16 at offset 0xB685 | 119 bytes |
embedded_file_obj0017.bine6c26a3478346d27e841ad49868ebf68bf4c6863b6750e8d60bda3c4c6f79876 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 17 at offset 0xB73E | 77 bytes |
embedded_file_obj0018.bin92a3ce61d783e15932b5de127ce45a9b4c2f98f4da2453f65241573c1dda808a |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 18 at offset 0xB7CD | 56 bytes |
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