Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a4933a4607727ada…

MALICIOUS

RTF

12.9 KB
MD5: 4e87ed4b9b082944c95ae960a71acee6 SHA-1: 079edad30842577bd3762d192a78e9967d226fe2 SHA-256: a4933a4607727ada5ae7ed0c79607911b7199876995e8e7dc835fe32437a6b06
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the embedded OLE object will be activated automatically, likely leading to the execution of code. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting vulnerabilities to download and run further malicious content.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001df7.bin
7b3ea0493b1a8a3cdcb11d1221bcaa4eeaa2460942ed9993e559aae2d42b16da		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1DF7 1712 bytes

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