Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a48c68a45c190e43…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.3 KB Created: 2021-08-09 11:42:14 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-14
MD5: 9aa90f9f6a444edb2b2e7d51abf8a085 SHA-1: d8ab238cd92a522cd58057d822e0cf88b90b5eaa SHA-256: a48c68a45c190e43e013d2dbe1e8192c0b3b613e8624ed58e2ab527af4e51e28
192 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF document contains numerous embedded URLs pointing to compromised websites and disposable hosting, suggesting it is part of a link farm designed to distribute malicious files. The presence of a 'Macro/content-enable lure' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to enable content, a common tactic for malware droppers. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly support its malicious nature, likely serving as a phishing or trojan delivery mechanism.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://smidgel.ru/uplcv?utm_term=debt+collection+letter+template+uk PDF link annotation
    • http://fly.no1-yes.com/userfiles/file/joxizi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://grafitpoint.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8868ad6c63974355f30e21b4cc7ff76d/7583029015.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://plumcourse.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b52ebd504206bd9303d68654c454b88f/5495472698.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://langfordfinancialservices.com/userfiles/files/94099481941.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://claudiodauelsberg.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d55b841660c---pupikabuwone.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.1000ena.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d8d96a90c13---gidafonoleg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://salwex.hu/file/104832456.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://singaporeroadshow.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ad558a153763a603c59182d080aab478/riroxasedifuzavadipaxewuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kfnmdg.com/upfolder/e/files/20210730181645.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://99shayari.in/userfiles/files/52662823109.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://espiber.cl/images/uploadedimages/file/95088355307.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bilbox.es/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/54e3cad0533e2381c699b4c812241b1c/jaruvewosezejobevekipi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://chochosanencino.com/uploads/files/pudarowofid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://skncn.com/u/files/82385346495.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kamber.dk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5138d9084fdbcf437476df64a7719d5c/43799222130.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://partnercable.hu/files/14293700209.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tuabogadoangel.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/97b5745b1066d7bc532d3236f70779f1/mupetaxovajexobetumurafu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://comicpapyrus.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2f0dc440ab07340886d2bce3b5cfd8d4/xupavubodewuxogetonafu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://klpa.net/userData/board/file/15261122473.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://planao.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/kidopebobigupemizirip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.eziblank.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/79808cf1e527d8b764286c0581277bbc/13097847269.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ecf7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xECF7 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0001050e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1050E 10700 bytes
SHA-256: dc2ba4d6d0b4125f577015fb2da1cfdc0d756668fe760affc639ea96184142d4
font_02_sfnt_off00011d57.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11D57 17488 bytes
SHA-256: b4b247c2337185d602b057c58c58a91e2bc1213cdcb163cf0a885dfdcde3b652

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