Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a46d7d9e08749000…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.0 KB Created: 2021-09-15 17:03:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: d9983c83d6c518a0c0a98709c0acf858 SHA-1: c0ec1f89f030bd8e2ca620192c280a46a6256591 SHA-256: a46d7d9e08749000968b46cd433fa3205219fb1f1cabd5dbb15d825a3713aa40
252 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and multiple heuristics indicate social engineering tactics designed to lure the user into executing commands. Specifically, the 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' and 'SE_CLICKFIX' heuristics suggest the document instructs the user to copy/paste commands into a terminal, likely to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of numerous links to potentially compromised WordPress sites and disposable hosting further supports a malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9975

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://rc-modeller.se/images/file///nerus.pdf
    • https://www.sidertest.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16133d25ae3773---sagidesuxi.pdf
    • http://sh8ke.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16131679c86e9f---40482355840.pdf
    • http://101balkon.ru/upload/files/somolowobenutofibufalo.pdf
    • http://educasters.co/ckfinder/userfiles/files/54847327484.pdf
    • http://4x4autok.hu/userfiles/files/toridorufedexof.pdf
    • http://rc-saty.cz/gais/image/file/85713128353.pdf
    • http://ncfc.com.tr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/26213937464.pdf
    • http://dailycan.com/userfiles/files/xowugagakojalukejoxaga.pdf
    • http://nujhimachal.in/img/uploads/files/ziwet.pdf
    • https://shrmivirtual.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5812ef5f2fdad3fbc80ae5e497c9a198/81779253591.pdf
    • http://ahzycw.com/upload_fck/file/2021-9-10/20210910124856664853.pdf
    • http://livestocktool.com/d/files/92261925345.pdf
    • https://guijek.com/userfiles/file/vexezudojizowurasim.pdf
    • http://chiesamadremarsala.eu/userfiles/files/54492599744.pdf
    • http://fairway.cc/images/blog/file/tivisexutojexixevexabuzoz.pdf
    • https://ijmscr.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/22759077592.pdf
    • http://scouttautomotive.com/editor_uploads/system/files/52096603040.pdf
    • http://otvorene-srdce.sk/userfiles/file/wizidewuniwekaxojig.pdf
    • http://gyn-ordi.at/myPix/file/13007444820.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/A3Ryygt5BCM/uplcv?utm_term=google+pixel+4a+5g+root
    • https://www.assessment.unibe.ch/app/webroot/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/98026543848.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ce2a.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCE2A 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000e63c.bin
5cf438749ff3c146ff14cfe69fc96f3f42b6dc5f5c2a7711a2b6fd3dacd5315f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE63C 17192 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000112ef.bin
2b843706450321d44b2a1c1a298608ceb7ce411806e27d13de1de655ebac8847		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x112EF 10508 bytes

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