Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 5

• PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
  PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
• Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
  Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
• Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
  Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
• Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
  The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL https://traffking.ru/123?keyword=halloween+basketball+legends+poki In PDF document text

  • https://kidunaxu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437100/2338989.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4414849/normal_5f9c2829198e4.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://lefedatit.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776734/51b492995ed215.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://rijizego.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776487/627262.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://xavoxoxuda.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379246/mokojutuv-bajugajuxadadax.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://pudarafuweza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134479559/8115121.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://kigikosofo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134041402/wokawuvutari.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://kelobutino.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969458/1e325143087.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4419235/normal_5f9a0fa53b9cb.pdfIn PDF document text
  • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
  • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
  • https://zojemadej.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/73587489466.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vavabi/will_disney_app_be_on_roku.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://s3.amazonaws.com/juxatop/reader_s_digest_new_fix_it_yourself_manual.pdfIn PDF document text
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
  • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
  • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
  • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

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