Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a46840188bad0e17…

MALICIOUS

PDF

54.1 KB Created: 2020-07-31 04:02:00 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-09
MD5: bf73ccb16c1c45fd1b11fa5ec8894a6a SHA-1: a531c068fe3315c20318b4fbea949e9afc8917cf SHA-256: a46840188bad0e175a1eaaae419035e269d4f6e41eed725052efc1651efbdc46
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains numerous links, with one critical heuristic identifying a malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, suggests a lure related to 'banking terms pdf for interview'. The presence of a link farm and a malicious redirector indicates an attempt to drive traffic to malicious infrastructure, likely for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=banking+terms+pdf+for+interview In PDF document text
    • http://files.interiordesigndepartment.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303238/292962.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.delannoylab.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406736/jogekenimaso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.samcoventry.co.uk/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776745/b02b637b9a5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.innerpathways.ca/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406885/682429.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.bolsterrogers.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437017/2d526ed22f73.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5313/7576/files/92243021474.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/1756/0473/files/95050038326.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8353/8331/files/37811103255.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/7231/4778/files/27251604188.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/4572/5094/files/dilejebigev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/12909571685.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/7029/1096/files/65349672120.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6849/7823/files/23337276698.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/4206/9918/files/rodijukufed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/8063/8879/files/617730223.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/3935/0181/files/92011723755.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5651/2667/files/27771797776.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/8855/2870/files/terosozopov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/0596/8537/files/33621605352.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
🗂 Part of campaign: bolsterrogers.com 6 samples

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000094fe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x94FE 5380 bytes
SHA-256: 431c12a7d6fe3786acb83d195df5e87a4e2ea24ca9568dff0af7a5ff9f085aa8
font_01_sfnt_off0000a747.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA747 10400 bytes
SHA-256: f0e1e140d117cea1b27aeefcef41096740e37082e5e099b254e6d39dd06d02b3