Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a45c0515592b382a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.3 KB Created: 2021-02-10 17:10:42 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 2afe0df691a2b9e40125a9c02796c745 SHA-1: 2660dc500b4ccc5d48c09c3b0a50f5424d51a56b SHA-256: a45c0515592b382ad3467fd96b88f0c324f937f5aee1651ec0ff6f0757631233
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable domains and hosted on services like Weebly and epizy.com, indicating a link farm. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or distributing further malicious content. The presence of numerous external links suggests an attempt to direct users to potentially harmful websites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://baarspo.ru/123?utm_term=atsg+4l60e+transmission+repair+manual PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vifutetax/0fKjhqW/27404704941.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vebudirepo/hahbUYM/runnings_st_cloud_mn_opening_date.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ejinaya.com/468433978337f41k.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fafujedajir/xxEidRK/walking_dead_game_characters_ranked.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lumevukivejus.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874583/nujekuzexasad_babufoliwepava_tufug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://particuliers-societegenerale.xyz/98368919666qf2r4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bizunasudene.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135345394/219834.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zenugewitewane.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/9/135960096/c7bd3911cfe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://moxumepavigotuf.iblogger.org/pujixajapizazukoba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://butevexonukuzi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681970/d50fff17db9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vupapevixu/JicQqC3/beautiful_couple_wallpapers_for_phones.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/togodawexu/hbIHrif/jidijuwavedagupuv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/ragojagef/ieifggr/kexiso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rofexelugikovu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134732340/jexuvuzofesa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://momerulazem.rf.gd/90244957936.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mipolerabafobe.epizy.com/fereraxuraji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://labopum.rf.gd/greatest_common_factor_worksheet_with_answer_key.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ddec.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDDEC 5512 bytes
SHA-256: 08261ca325698d2bc1c1b5ea231736834f640bc81e039fa98bc82f76e1f4fae1
font_01_sfnt_off0000f09e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF09E 10268 bytes
SHA-256: 1fc32b1e481b040e0e014fa0087e82855467812196117881251472bb5aaa0716