RTF malware analysis — malicious · a45a801151d502df

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.6 KB First seen: 2021-06-13

MD5: d49976b71b8b8cd9f90841d1fa5c5231 SHA-1: a8bbe74174e72ab89aebe1102d91e6297e43178c SHA-256: a45a801151d502df1c9b881a230c43bab5d94a6313d2404a7b91d65ceb4e5921

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates the file is designed to exploit a known flaw in Microsoft Equation Editor to achieve code execution upon opening. The presence of ".objupdate" further suggests an attempt to force the activation of the embedded OLE object, likely to trigger the exploit.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000000b1.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xB1	2081 bytes
SHA-256: `677e961a24ff84dbba92ffe0164dc1ad7236b277d98983fe73e5162ed4aee06e`

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