Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a44708102c7ba51e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

66.6 KB Created: 2021-02-24 14:34:07 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 266c49933948773329a1002db87f09ff SHA-1: 94a6347eac88e62ed63e98db9d2e02c875d2a018 SHA-256: a44708102c7ba51e9c05a11d0826edf2e87b75ddae7f3f6f87d4c4e42d32c45c
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicative of a link farm. The ML classifier and ClamAV heuristic strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or SEO manipulation. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URIs point towards a malicious document designed to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jottigo.ru/aws?utm_term=wayne+dalton+garage+door+opener+replacement+parts PDF link annotation
    • http://strahauto.website/72413773537gtch8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pepomujotopulog.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134873529/372b874495c3c9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4413843/normal_6008ee285499a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://puviguwa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776677/minogatub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4412778/normal_5fcb9453497e7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lukuxafibufogi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/4/135400428/karozerijitofo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://goponubinolofuv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134695307/gokilog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nirulutot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134700174/mojutaxorowobaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lijotabele.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134016876/5613645.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gavuwili.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070236/7033723.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://serawododi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134885696/7705721.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bizotimugir.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164076/9249540.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4370054/normal_601cc298f079c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pelozaxuji.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132680784/getixokedizeguvatin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zokejiwiperasuk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134668939/4240818.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c8e6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC8E6 5508 bytes
SHA-256: 05d9e15390892121e5510caf56d93e45cb362b300a1f3dd44704fa69a506c5b9
font_01_sfnt_off0000dba0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDBA0 9696 bytes
SHA-256: ed929761c65d5bb0bf1d5ee6a2e87242e65fb4c1fe37c99d402d1a199f678dd1

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