Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a43a486964f34ce4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.6 KB Created: 2020-08-30 14:12:10 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: e4cc20d0aa477d8ec1d3b5845fa0ccb1 SHA-1: ccfab7fd52cbc8499baa6b9b08f33b166ca0093d SHA-256: a43a486964f34ce4d6ff7757ae59e7ac2db905eaaf2a49b1bedb2efd7a7a0d14
130 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a link that redirects to a malicious URL, disguised with a download button lure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the malicious URL and references to other PDFs hosted on static.usrfiles.com. This suggests a phishing or scam attempt to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=left+4+dead+2+android+apk+indir
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/93c935_19b531a975e84f698789ed296dc62f30.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/0aab01_96271f9b95244f37819345039b8d63d8.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_2fcc576ca8564adf9185efd0e838529a.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/3aee12_b3b72d53340b448284c8e97e7599fe7a.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_b494aee22bf24c66a2f01cbaac0af754.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/696b8a_e497e760d6d442e1aebfd2b354ebd934.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/12f4eb_c9923318029b468fabe7168ca5a0e936.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/accd1f_df6840f262fc41bbb2ba9a0b392245b2.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/33a16d_f05c3a5d805244eeb1d317013512c925.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/a86d68_f3485273bdcd4596be857b7a20d10636.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/a298ce_91a6193a8f744719849a065198cc2812.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/2074c9_9ccd6712888649d2bded73e2dbc2308d.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_c84418c1503d410ba113c80ac25457ed.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/9597/2256/files/winokunexomomejeveloki.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/5655/4394/files/woruwumikotuloduluwalufe.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006fc9.bin
ab82bb00fc718cf20fdeaa65ab9df9c550a34b7d415400038889a707d70bdd2c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6FC9 5052 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008116.bin
a945ba20e39aa9b8f50678a66c2489faa0cedf0646103e5e9ec8ac7ab1c7abca		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8116 10476 bytes

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