Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a4358b898c418522…

MALICIOUS

RTF

12.6 KB
MD5: 40f03856876fda8b3bda880d1d5a4636 SHA-1: d252c054154c5524dfbf3f3238b32f711290fd36 SHA-256: a4358b898c41852211ee727e4b8c0d05301bf4c6a90a4780c5a6f8b1b1cf5c81
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of malicious activity, specifically related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of OLE object data and automatic linking suggests an attempt to embed and activate external content. The critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic confirms the exploitation of a known vulnerability, likely leading to the download and execution of a second-stage payload. The SHA256 hash is provided as a primary IOC.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001e9f.bin
9e4a7bfcba0ae43aa68c516538705c53984d2e9982836785a1f377295347e725
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1E9F 1529 bytes