Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a424b74b85555ab6…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

229.3 KB
MD5: 9d67ea444c33df92308bcaee9ae07e2e SHA-1: 80f10deb144c76619371a27c06751d143760585f SHA-256: a424b74b85555ab69a801e384f4fa12711c0957e1354fd4859cd813d09bd26f2
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, which are designed to trigger execution upon opening. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document likely contains instructions to the user to enable content, a common tactic for macro-based malware droppers. Without a document body or script content, the exact payload and delivery mechanism cannot be definitively determined, leading to an 'unknown family' classification.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
173aaa156facd15b345e929f010b4e7efbad9c863be42b409f7b6def5f0f0b73		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 20622 bytes
objdata_01_off0000b194.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB194 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000c737.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC737 12297 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.