Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a3f659f69af881da…

MALICIOUS

RTF

12.0 KB
MD5: 2fdf771221253c034cb69f52209d9de3 SHA-1: f9e5fc146537b14846686f24cf3776b2ea096bd7 SHA-256: a3f659f69af881da3c76ce0271cad4875aeeddbe1b7f27a7601607223fa92ac1
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR) and forces OLE activation ( objupdate). This indicates an attempt to execute embedded code, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The presence of OLE object data further supports this conclusion.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001b66.bin
0c139b72d24f2aecae6dea7890c58a76941160178a62971e88310e896fce6822
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1B66 1337 bytes