MALICIOUS
392
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1204 User Execution
The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary PDF payload which, in turn, has a direct link to an executable or archive. The ClamAV detection name 'Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0' and the embedded URL strongly suggest a downloader functionality.
Heuristics 10
-
Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVEAn embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
-
Equation Editor OLE object high OLE_EQUATION_EDITORContains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
-
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGEA valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
-
PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINKPDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
-
ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
-
ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAVClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
-
Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASIONPDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
-
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
-
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTALThe same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
-
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
Extracted artifacts 8
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673 |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 1206 bytes |
ole10native_00.binbe8727b84c27d3400b2ef213dd4a7566dfa2fd9370947b78231b9bc05f514038 |
ole-package | OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0008D0CB/oLe10native | 1558 bytes |
polyglot_child_pdf_off00076c00.pdfda6062bab527bc50392325577fbe7a905e66e3a564eaa2bfeb8612fdeb3c73e3 |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x76C00 | 843264 bytes |
|
Detection
ClamAV:
Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
Obfuscation or payload:
unlikely
|
|||
font_00_sfnt_off0000817d.bin68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x817D | 12100 bytes |
font_01_sfnt_off00009f95.bin50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9F95 | 15820 bytes |
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdfbe010868c8c21914fe82e5e2631f938dba676f7d27103fd69f4bcafd7d9f18f6 |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 | 1325568 bytes |
|
Detection
ClamAV:
Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
Obfuscation or payload:
unlikely
|
|||
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006200.pdfbcd4d4cfe543e4317f57e327e66e99751803b912cb2f641e0f35999cb96f4cc3 |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6200 | 1304576 bytes |
|
Detection
ClamAV:
Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
Obfuscation or payload:
unlikely
|
|||
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000e600.pdf3985145136180810182a0f633beda28b0c7fd8a8deae5fb411aa21217213e418 |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE600 | 1270784 bytes |
|
Detection
ClamAV:
Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
Obfuscation or payload:
unlikely
|
|||
Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.