Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a3b28cb4dbc03a2b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.3 KB Created: 2021-02-27 04:58:29 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: a23ea09702c1f6e1f34c3bb44f10e59a SHA-1: ec9e2b2b59e31a4a60f1e3dd4563ff19b5b5a02d SHA-256: a3b28cb4dbc03a2b541e3fbdce3fa5b4083dd3646abbdb824919d834977081f0
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple embedded URLs, with at least one identified as a malicious redirector. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. The document body is heavily obfuscated and unreadable, but the presence of links to known malicious infrastructure is a high-confidence indicator of a phishing or trojan delivery attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/strik?utm_term=army+drill+and+ceremony+questions In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4450045/normal_602f97cfb827d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4366020/normal_5fc8534fc1b1d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4414688/normal_5fd2398d5826a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gezagijuxeson.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872295/2380935.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zitekimuzefovar.iblogger.org/bts_dna_mp4_planetlagu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4480148/normal_5fc94e3432703.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4372074/normal_5fea3bab98943.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nafoxuda/mifaki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://delozaroj.epizy.com/weredalomosa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/paxivogedewilu/c._a._n_full_form_in_law.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://guligakifiw.epizy.com/nefatovurasidol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gafamiziwadi.rf.gd/ganinogizaranajawegesafuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dojiseb.epizy.com/wuvigewibaxepanakeviwifil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e621.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE621 5300 bytes
SHA-256: b5d50d02076011d8ba3caf9d287fc39059205e8412a6e5c10be01ac1936411b8
font_01_sfnt_off0000f813.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF813 10552 bytes
SHA-256: 8cddfc62b823a8fdb0784353f01ff8982db75c82824c0a168516ca9a40ba09c6

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