Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a3aeffd955a2d75b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

50.7 KB
MD5: 0e4b71cc1ea1770a5621335e857a5b1d SHA-1: 70148ec593805a5095bad428ba7c303bbf91bf94 SHA-256: a3aeffd955a2d75b33f2d8f35dde1979c3b7e4d08bb642d3bef7f0805289bf17
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically. This strongly suggests an exploit targeting a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component, likely to achieve arbitrary code execution. The primary goal is presumed to be the download and execution of a secondary payload, although no specific payload details were extracted.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000013da.bin
4ba3ab0948a53de9c68328740cecc38e3b4cba76d77fd247875feba3c2dace27
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x13DA 1813 bytes