Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a3aa95b7e03b4c1b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

269.0 KB Authoring application: Python PDF Library 055 http072057057pybrary056net057pyPdf057
MD5: d5c54cb72429dd1354d1a57f8d2b7c45 SHA-1: 970a03ff768c163f83e1f17113c64ee5d0342d7b SHA-256: a3aa95b7e03b4c1b6cbaecb1eb1485a9acb3e7f8348e76c054a66f7eb80a577f
124 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and a RichMedia (Flash) object, indicating an attempt to execute malicious code. A secondary embedded PDF was also detected with similar suspicious findings. The presence of these elements suggests the PDF is designed to exploit vulnerabilities or trick the user into executing a malicious payload, likely via the embedded Flash or secondary PDF. The benign reputation of the only extracted URL reduces confidence in direct network-based exploitation.

Heuristics 6

  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://adobe.com/AS3/2006/builtin

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
pushpro.swf
f30a754153ec4fca6ea9fb770704c65d16bb94933b633b8d6ec5725c761d79c6
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 7 at offset 0xB4F 772 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00041b6a.pdf
2ef0aba7c677bdfc575110b615e2dbfcb45bb31c6ff02cd4bc25c6f469a5b5b0
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x41B6A 6297 bytes