Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a39d706e1084ecf8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.4 KB Created: 2021-02-17 11:54:04 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 2410b42417c95154d5db6c0b15e4f0b7 SHA-1: f78a8e4fe7636df09f75b708ac9c912e899ea69b SHA-256: a39d706e1084ecf80bc7733fd911587acde874d6748709ad1063e9a22840e710
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or phishing campaign. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, appears to be a lure related to 'Realspace mobile tech desk instructions', aiming to direct users to malicious URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jacksth.ru/123?utm_term=realspace+mobile+tech+desk+instructions PDF link annotation
    • https://dekedenavit.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134612093/9655334.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fortuneocredit.com/kepilulosatulifotizopavuc4dnu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4380854/normal_5fdf794f1637a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fadasizoguwo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/6/0/136050507/vipowovin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rirenanevigi.22web.org/business_model_canvas_template_online.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://usersdeviceprotectionservice.site/velomijanabizelukolidorw2pro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lividuxu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134354071/kepebidozidiroxibut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4489595/normal_6016e38eb32d0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://monoga.space/58540514285bjvas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://numurivigafezu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134390613/pifomulap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pawasisuleti.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134652657/22dab95e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://barovupaxar.epizy.com/16512802.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gezizefefififa/timupuzunogul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vuterijoze/buxejiwuralasepurowifu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://viwivebobip.epizy.com/cm_browser_old_version_apk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c9d8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC9D8 5408 bytes
SHA-256: 070b302152f472a650ffd0f3a0836429ad7de143403e52563dbaa9cd3cef1355
font_01_sfnt_off0000dc0a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDC0A 11116 bytes
SHA-256: ebe1f73c1c0bfdb0e3f90003d25a51e711db0639971c34af96c800433558f961
font_02_sfnt_off000100b0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x100B0 4324 bytes
SHA-256: d1f4a20f0e35a0564be54678b929bb8c711862c507f070c2b9a6abea8daf4378

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